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Using the results from a comprehensive telephone survey of home builders during 2007-8 and 
2014-15, we provide an analysis of the behaviour, characteristics and perceptions of cash 
economy activity in the building and construction sector in Australia. In 2012-13, the ATO 
introduced the Taxable Payment Reporting System which yielded an additional compliance 
dividend. By comparing responses of builders before and after the introduction of this reporting 
system, we evaluate the impact of this regulatory change on grassroots activity in the cash 
economy. Although this regulatory change has impacted on certain cash economy activities, 





Times may be tough, but many ordinary citizens are doing it better than they will admit. 
Estimates of the cash economy around the world suggest that these activities operate in parallel 
with legitimate economic activities and for a number of countries the cash economy comprises 
a relative large component of overall economic activity (for example, see Buehn and Schneider, 
2012). This is particularly so for the less developed economies where regulatory measures to 
ensure tax compliance are weak or insufficient (for the OECD: see Feld and Schneider (2010); 
for Asia see: Bajada and Schneider (2005a), and Africa see: Kodila-Tedika and Mutascu 
(2014). In other studies (see for example, Bajada, 2005 and Bajada and Schneider, 2009) the 
cash economy is also found to harbor the unemployed who choose to actively participating in 
the cash economy while receiving unemployment benefits.  
 
The cash economy encapsulates activities that ought to be recorded in the national accounts 
but is not because of taxpayers’ failure to report income in whole or in part. For others, the 
cash economy includes not only activities that fall within national accounting boundaries but 
also illegal activities such as prostitution and drug trafficking. In some countries certain 
activities, which are illegal by one country’s standards, are not illegal in another and so the 
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boundary between what is and is not in the national accounts will vary. In the broader national 
economic context, the cash economy consists of activities that would normally be captured in 
the national accounts, but because of the failure to report income in-whole or in-part, is neither 
measured nor taxed. All forms of criminal activities, such as theft, drug trafficking and 
prostitution, are not measured in the national accounts and therefore not included in the 
definition of the cash economy. For the same reason, all types of do-it-yourself activities, such 
as household repairs and maintenance by homeowners as well as other non-market activities 
do not form part of the cash economy. Because we are interested only in the extent by which 
the national accounts are under-estimated and tax is evaded, these activities are not typically 
included in the estimates of the cash economy (see Bajada and Schneider, 2005b). 
 
Much has been written on the size and the socio-economic effects of the cash economy 
worldwide. These effects include amongst others, a decline in tax revenue (e.g., Vlachaki, 
2015; Schneider, 2012.), distortions in economic and social data (e.g., Houston, 1990), unfair 
price competition, a worsening of tax morality (e.g., Frey, Weck and Pommerehne, 1982) and 
an increasing skewness in the income distribution towards those who go undetected in receipt 
of cash payments (e.g., Houston, 1987). Much of this literature has focused on producing 
national estimates of the cash economy (i.e. aggregated across all industry sectors) with the 
objective of examining the likely effects and public policy implications from significant non-
compliance. There are a number of broad methodologies into which attempts to measure the 
cash economy fall and although each method may differ from application to application, the 
underlying conclusions from these studies are that the cash economy in many countries is quite 
large and growing overtime. Although these national estimates of the cash economy tell us 
something about the tax gap and the overall adverse economic and social implications that such 
activities may have on society, they tell us very little on the distribution of these activities 
across the various industries in each of these countries. It may very well be that the cash 
economy is dominant in just a few industries, with only minor levels of non-compliant activities 
in others. Without such disaggregated measures of the cash economy, it is difficult for 
policymakers to formulate industry strategies to eliminate these illicit activities. Having 
information on the cash economy at the industry level not only supports targeted strategies, it 
also allows for appropriate benchmarking of compliance outcomes to gauge the success of the 
strategy. A regulatory change that improves compliance outcomes is positive but it does not 
indicate how close to target the compliance measure has come in identifying and discouraging 
non-compliant behavior.  
 
There are only few studies that have produced estimates of the cash economy at the sector or 
industry level, and even fewer still for the building and construction industry. Those estimates 
of the cash economy at the level of the building and construction industry which are most 
relevant here include:  for Australia: CETF, 1998, 2003; ABS, 2004; and various Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) publications such as (ATO (2015); for Canada: KPMG, et.al. 1997; 
O’Grady and Lampert, 1998; O’Grady, 1998, 2001; Statistics Canada, 1994; AHBR, 2004; 
NSDF, 1997; Zanasi, 1996; for the UK: DTI, 2002 and 2003). The Ontario Construction 
Secretariat estimates the cash economy in the building construction industry in Nova Scotia, 
Canada, to be 26% of the sector’s overall GDP (see O’Grady, 1998, 2001 and AHBR, 2004). 




Statistics Canada on the other hand, estimates the size of the shadow economy in the building 
construction industry to be 10% of the sector’s GDP, while the Atlantic Home Building and 
Renovation Sector Council (AHBR, 2004) estimates the shadow economy in Nova Scotia to 
be 25% of the sector’s GDP, similar in size to the estimates by the Ontario Constriction 
Secretariat.  
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2004) embarked on an exercise to evaluate the accuracy 
and reliability of the Australian national accounts, in which they evaluated the maximum 
likelihood of under-reporting in each of the broad industry sectors (including construction). 
This study however did not directly produce an estimate of the cash economy for the building 
and construction industry. Neither has the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) produced any 
specific estimates of the size of the cash economy, although they indirectly provide evidence 
of its significant size through their reports on tax compliance outcomes. The most recent of 
these (see ATO, 2015) suggests that following a new regulatory reporting requirement (Taxable 
Payments Reporting System) introduced in July 2012, an additional $2 billion of income tax 
and GST revenue for the financial year 2012-13 was extracted from the building and 
construction industry.  
 
The objective of this paper is to undertake an analysis of data collected from two surveys of 
businesses in the home building sector in (Sydney) Australia to elicit information on cash 
economy activities. This information will shed light on the types of cash economy activities 
taking place, the profile of these cash economy participants, the likely regions of greater cash 
economy intensity and the perceptions on how effective government are in dealing with the 
cash economy. The first of these surveys was conducted during December 2007 to February 
2008; and the second during December 2014 to February 2015. The two surveys will help 
gauge changes in cash economy activity over this period of time. In particular it will also 
facilitate an evaluation of a regulatory change in reporting requirements for businesses 
operating in the building and construction industry. The regulatory change involved the 
introduction of the Taxable Payments Reporting system (TPRS) brought into force in July 2012 
requiring builders to report the specific payments made to each contractor during the financial 
year. This information is then used by the ATO to data match income reported (or under-
reported) by these contractors in the industry.   
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we outline the economic and 
social consequences of a significant cash economy and in Section 3 we provide an overview of 
the Australian building and construction industry with a focus on the characteristics of the 
sector that increase the risk of workers participating in the cash economy. In Section 4 we 
discuss the survey instrument used, including the methodology and profile of the various 
builder respondents to the surveys. In Section 5 we consider the effects of non-compliance 
from the change in regulatory reporting on cash economy activity between 2007 and 2014 - 
including how perceptions on the cash economy changed following the introduction of the 
Taxable Payments Reporting System. In Section 6 we conclude. 
 
A The Economics and Social Consequences of the Cash Economy? 




For our purposes we define the cash economy as consisting of activities which would normally 
be measured in the national accounts, but because of the failure to report income in whole or 
in-part is neither measured nor taxed. All forms of criminal activities, such as theft, drug 
trafficking and prostitution, are generally not part of the cash economy as these are not typically 
measured as part of GDP. All types of do-it-your-self activities, such as household repairs, 
maintenance by the homeowner and other non-market activities, do not form part of the cash 
economy because neither of these activities are measured in the national accounts.  
Why is reducing the size of the cash economy so important? When an individual participates 
in the cash economy and does not pay their fair share of tax, the rest of the community must 
bear the burden of higher taxes that may be needed to continue funding government 
expenditure. If there are only a small number of participants in these clandestine activities, the 
burden may be spread thinly on the community, diluting significantly any adverse effects on 
those complying with their tax obligations. If on the other hand, the numbers of participants 
are large and the extent of evasion is significant, the compliant community suffers. The 
implications of a sizeable cash economy include: 
i. Declining tax revenue - whenever participation in the cash economy expands, tax revenue 
losses add to the financial pressures of government to satisfy the service needs of the 
community. A significant cash economy deprives the government of much needed tax 
revenue to fund public works. 
ii. Distortions of Economic and Social Data - unreliable data affects the credibility of any 
statistical estimates attempting to model an economic phenomenon. This may give rise to 
inefficient policy prescriptions particularly if it is driven by changes in the published data. 
The gauge most commonly used to measure the functioning of the economy, namely the 
behaviour of economic variables, can be significantly distorted by the existence of a non-
negligible cash economy and undoubtedly this has a serious implication for the business 
cycle in general; 
iii. Tax Morality - If the community acknowledges that the cash economy is growing and not 
being detected, there is an incentive to encourage a more active involvement or motivate 
new participants to join. 
iv. Unfair Price Competition - Honest businesses face the threat of closure with unfair price 
competition coming from businesses that actively participate in the cash economy in an 
attempt to cut costs. 
v. Welfare Effects  - Those who participate in the cash economy may be contributing far less 
than honest taxpayers for the rights to use government goods and services, therefore 
creating a distortion on the distribution of welfare, particularly if the unemployed are 
surreptitiously also working in the cash economy while receiving unemployment benefits. 
vi. Implications for Efficiency - The cash economy may distort the allocation of economic 
resources particularly if it channels them into sectors of the economy where tax evasion is 
more pronounced. 
vii. Unregulated Activities – the cash economy may result in poor work place practices that 
ultimately do not offer the same guarantees of workmanship as one would expect of goods 
and services provided in the legitimate sector. 




Across many countries, taxation offices have initiated tax compliance programs and 
enforcement processes to mitigate against growing pressures of cash economy activity. In the 
Australian context, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has over many years devoted 
resources and implementing policies to tackle evidence of a growing cash economy, 
particularly in specific industries where cash is used more extensively. In 1996 the Australian 
Commissioner for Taxation established a Cash Economy Task Force (CETF) to address what 
appeared to be a growing community perception that the cash economy was growing which in 
the process much has been learnt on what motivates the participants in the cash economy. More 
recently in 2012-13, the ATO has introduced the Taxable Payment Reporting System in the 
building industry, requiring organisations to report specific payments to contractors and sub-
contractors in attempt to data-match and uncover surreptitious economic activity in the building 
industry. 
 
II  THE HOME BUILDING INDUSTRY IN AUSTRALIA 
The home building industry is part of the broader building and construction sector that in 2014 
contributed to approximately 8% of GDP (see ABS, Australian National Accounts: National 
Income, Expenditure and Product).  The home building industry ranks second in size to 
engineering construction and is larger than all the non-residential building and construction 
activities combined. On the employment front, the building and construction industry is the 
third largest employer in Australia, behind health and retail services.  The majority of workers 
in the building and construction industry are employed in trade services – the component of 
the sector that most likely poses the greatest risk for cash economy activity. 
The data presented in this section provides some key indicators of the likelihood that there 
exists a cash economy in the home building industry. These indicators, along with the findings 
from the survey results reported in Section 4 provide an insight into the dynamics of this 
surreptitious sector of the economy.  The key indicators from the home building industry data 
include: (i) the size and mix of residential building construction activity; and (ii) the 
employment profile of people working in this sector. The emphasis on point (i) will be on the 
mix between renovations and repairs versus new dwelling construction, as the former is more 
likely to involve cash and contribute to the overall size of the cash economy. The emphasis on 
point (ii) will be on the nature and profile of employment (e.g. employees versus self-
employed) and earning differentials between those working in the home building industry 
compared to the earnings of those working in the other sectors of the economy.  
The focus of this paper is on the Sydney home building industry as the surveys are drawn from 
the businesses in the Sydney residential construction sector. In Table 1 we illustrate the size of 
the Sydney market as of August 2016 to coincide with the time period in this analysis. In the 
first row of Table 1 we find that the state of NSW contributed to one-third of Australia’s total 
residential construction value, while in the second row of Table 1 we see that Sydney 
contributes to approximately 62% of the value of new home construction and 76% of the value 
of alternations/additions that occur in NSW. The results are also reflected in the physical 
number of dwellings given in column 3 of Table 1. This suggests that the cash economy in 




NSW is most likely to be dominated by activities in the Sydney region. As a percentage of all 
Australian residential construction, the Sydney market comprises approximately 16% of all 
new house constructions and 25% of alterations and additions to residential dwellings.  
Table 1 – Sydney and NSW Residential Construction market- August 2016 































Aust) 24.3 36.6 30.5 25.5 39.6 32.9 32.3 31.3 
Sydney  
(% of 
NSW) 59.4 88.9 76.8 61.5 91.5 76.3 78.7 76.4 
Sydney  
(% of 
Aust) 14.4 32.5 23.4 15.7 36.2 25.1 25.4 23.9 
Source: 87310DO002_201608 Building Approvals, Australia, Aug 2016. 
 
In Table 2 the greatest proportion of registered businesses are in the south and west of Sydney, 
with the smallest proportions in the East and Inner Sydney. This particular result may be due 
to the cost of housing, where housing is relatively cheaper in the west and south than it is in 
the north and east of Sydney. This result also suggests that business activity isn’t typically 
concentrated within regions and that builders will travel across the Sydney region to find work. 
This hypothesis is consistent with the data collected from the two surveys (to be discussed in 
Section 3).  
 







(% of Total) 
Inner Sydney 816 3.4 
East 1261 5.3 
South 8135 34.0 
West 7236 30.2 
North 6495 27.1 
Total 23943 100 
Source: ABS - 1380.0.55.008 - Perspectives on Regional Australia:  
Business Owners in Regions Table 2: Business Owners (a),  
Industry of Employment, by Statistical Area Level 4. 
 
In Figure 1 we plot the number of employed people in the construction sector as a percentage 
of total employment across all industries leading up to the last survey conducted. From 1985 
until 2014, the percentage of individuals employed in the construction sector has risen from 




approximately 7% in 1985 to 9%. In NSW, the percentage of people employed in construction 
as a percentage of Australian workers has been relatively stable until 2005 but on a steady 
decline since. However, the percentage of all NSW workers employed in the construction 
industry has been on the rise, with the obvious slowdown in employment during the Global 
Financial Crisis.  
 
Figure 1 – Employment in the Building and Construction Industry 
 
Source: DXdata: (1) Seas adj: CP: Commenced: Residential building: New: Houses: Total (CKRQ.AC__ZN#A#01); 
(2) Seas adj: CP: Commenced: Residential building: Alterations & additions: Total (CKRQ.AC__ZA#A#RL);  (3) 
Seas adj: CP: Commenced: Residential building: Total: Total (CKRQ.AC__Z##A#RL). 
 
A Change in Tax Reporting Requirements 
One of the most commonly cited drivers for participating in the cash economy, second only to 
the tax burden, is the effectiveness of the tax authorities to tackle illicit economic activities 
when they occur. The fact that the cash economy exists and is significant in size throughout 
many countries, would suggest that the effectiveness of the tax authorities to stem the tide of 
these activities in those countries has been rather limited. Improving and innovating the 
processes to ‘track’ the flow of funds would ultimately prove to be a game-changer for those 
participating in these illicit activities. During the 2012-13 financial year, the ATO implemented 
a change in its expenditure reporting requirements for businesses in the building and 
construction industry, namely that they would be required to report all individual payments 
made to their contractors. This change, known as the Taxable Payments Reporting System, 
requires businesses to report the total amount of the payment made to individual contractors 
including the amount of Goods and Services Tax (GST) paid as well as other information 
including the contractor’s business name, address and Australian Business Number (ABN). 
This information allows the ATO to data match the information provided by the same 




contractors. Equipped with such information, the ATO is in a position to identify contractors 
who chose to selectively under-report or not report at all. The post-implementation results 
produced a significant compliance dividend. For the period 2012-2013, the ATO collected an 
additional $2 billion in revenue comprising of $0.265 billion in lodgement of returns; $0.506 
billion in Goods and Services Tax (GST); $1.128 billion in pay-as-you-go withholding tax; and 
$0.357 billion in pay-as-you-go instalment payments (see ATO, 2015). The ATO has also 
reported that ‘the total value of obligations reported on these activity statements has also 
increased. Net GST increased by 6.1% and Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) withholdings has grown 
by 7.9% from 2011-12 to 2012-13.’ (ATO, 2015). At the organisational level, the ATO 
identified that a total of 53,089 businesses in the building and construction industry under-
reported income (of $1000 or less) and 33,312 businesses did not report any income at all in 
the 2012-13 financial year. 
This simple but effective regulatory change has had a measureable impact on the compliance 
dividend. But how significant an impact did this have on the overall size of the cash economy? 
If direct estimates of the cash economy in the building and construction industry were available, 
the overall impact of this regulatory change could be evaluated. It would then be possible to 
determine the next strategy to further narrow the tax gap if the estimates of the cash economy 
still proved to be too high. In this paper we evaluate the effects of this regulatory change by 
comparing survey responses of builders on cash economy activity before and after this 
regulatory change. We compare builder’s observations on the behaviour of contractors and sub-
contractors, those supplying materials in the building and construction industry, the effects 
(adverse or otherwise) of the cash economy on legitimate business activity, perceived estimates 
of the cash economy including effects on prices and business income, and the effectiveness of 
government agencies to deal with the cash economy. We first turn our attention to the survey 
instrument in Section 4and compare the effects of the regulatory change in Section 5.  
 
III SURVEY DATA 
Surveys have on occasions been used as indirect methods of estimating the size of the cash 
economy. The more direct methods include the use of the monetary method (see Tanzi, 1983), 
the MIMIC approach (see Giles, 1999), physical input method (see Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 
1996; and Kaufmann, Johnson and Shleifer; 1997) and the RESET approach (see   
Bhattacharyya, 1990) amongst others.  The use of surveys typically involves asking the 
individuals whether they have actively participated in the cash economy. Some surveys take 
the form of direct contact between the interviewer and the respondent. In other surveys, the 
respondents are required to complete a questionnaire and submit or mail back their responses. 
Other surveys use the combinations of these two methods for eliciting information. Typically 
the questions require the respondents to answer whether they are a buyer or seller in the cash 
economy. Others may use more indirect questioning in an attempt to uncover the bias in 
responses that result from directly asking the respondent whether they have failed to meet their 
tax obligations.  




Although susceptible to some bias from the sensitive nature of the topic (see Hansson, 1989), 
surveys have typically been favoured by government departments interested to know the extent 
of illicit economic behaviour. Typically surveys are in the form of interviews in which a 
representative sample of the population is asked whether they have participated as buyers or 
sellers of labour and/or goods in the cash economy. Surveys from Italy (Censis, 1976), United 
States (Ross, 1978) Britain (Dilnot and Morris, 1981), Belgium (Pestiau, 1983), Norway 
(Isachsen and Strom, 1989), Netherlands (Van Eck and Kazemier, 1988) and Germany (Frey, 
Weck and Pommerehne, 1982) each reached the conclusion that despite the sensitive nature of 
this topic, it was possible to deduce that the extent of illicit behaviour had been growing over 
the period covered by the surveys. The direct methods of estimating the cash economy for these 
countries also confirm these findings, although the estimates vary considerably from country 
to country. Unlike the indirect methods, surveys have the potential to undercover a considerable 
amount of information about the quality of work and the characteristics of employment (see 
Frey and Pommerehne, 1984).  
In almost all cases the interviewer assures the prospective respondent that the information they 
provide will not be disclosed and that their identity will be removed from the survey record to 
guarantee their anonymity. As one might expect, because of the nature of the topic, most 
respondents are likely to deny being involved in the cash economy because of fear of being 
detected and punished despite the promises that might be made by the interviewer. Isachsen, 
Klovland and Strom (1982) found that more people admitted to paying for irregular services 
than actually participating in the cash economy. It might also be the case that some individuals 
claim to be participating in the cash economy when in fact they may not. They may also choose 
to do so simply to sensationalise the discussion with the interviewer. For these reasons alone, 
the results from such surveys are likely to downward bias the true extent of participation in the 
cash economy and so it is also possible in this study that the estimates of the cash economy are 
understated. Nevertheless every effort has been made to ensure that the extent of the potential 
bias is as small as possible. 
The survey questions were framed in a way that the respondents were not asked to provide their 
own personal experiences but rather what they observed in the course of their activities in the 
building industry. By framing the questions in this particular way, an individual can report their 
own or what they see occurring in the sector in the context of a ‘third party’ and in so doing 
provide a more reasonable estimate of the activities in the cash economy. By taking this 
approach we did observe that the majority of the builders were quite willing to engage in 
detailed discussion on the nature and methods by which individual builders operate in the cash 
economy.  
The survey instrument used in this paper combines the author’s own questions with those used 
by the Atlantic Home Building and Renovation Sector Council.1  The survey was implemented 
over two periods: during December 2007 – February 2008 and again in December 2014 – 
                                                          
1 Permission was sought and granted for the use of these questions. 




February 20152, during which time the ATO introduced a regulatory reporting change (Taxable 
Payments Reporting System in July 2012) for the building and construction industry. Although 
the introduction of this regulatory change in reporting requirements appears to have been quite 
successful from a compliance dividend perspective, it is still unknown what the impact has 
been on the overall size, perceptions, observations and motivations of those working the 
building and construction industry. The use of a survey instrument before and after the 
introduction of this change in the reporting requirements will shed light on the dynamics of the 
inner-workings of the cash economy. The remainder of this section provides details of the target 
population, the methodology used and the characteristics of the respondents who completed 
the two surveys. The anonymous nature of the surveys and the process of separating the 
respondent’s details from their survey response imply that it is not possible to identify how 
many builders in the first survey were also participants in the second survey and how their 
responses changed following the introduction on the ATO’s reporting change requirements3. 
Despite this, the two survey waves facilitate a comparison on general attitudinal and 
observational changes on cash economy activity in the building industry; particularly the 
impact the change in reporting requirements has on the perceptions that governments are 
effective in addressing tax evasion.  
 
A Target population and methodology 
The target population for this survey were professional builders involved in the construction of 
new dwellings and those involved in renovations and repairs in the residential construction 
sector. The sample of builders for this survey was drawn from the list of names and contact 
telephone numbers publicly available on the Master Builders Association website. The Master 
Builders Association is the major building and construction industry association in Australia. 
In addition, other builders’ contact details were also sourced from advertisements in the Sydney 
local area newspapers (also published online). The survey was conducted by telephone and 
each builder was invited to participate in the survey. If any builder was unable to answer the 
questions at the time when they were initially contacted, they were asked if there was a suitable 
time for them to be contacted again. In the few instances when this occurred, the majority of 
the builders requested that they be contacted in the evening and with the exception of a few 
builders, they all participated in the surveys. Each telephone interview lasted between 25 to 30 
minutes. Given the nature of the survey questions and the duration of time (which each 
respondent was advised in advance), the response rates (see below) was higher that initially 
expected and above the usual response rates observed for similar surveys conducted elsewhere 
on this topic. What were noticeably different in each survey were the low response rates from 
                                                          
2 The first survey commenced during the early part of December 2007 and again during February 2008, allowing 
time for the builders to return from their holidays over the January period. The second survey was undertaken 
during a similar period: December 2014 and continued during February 2015. 
3 The university’s ethics approval granted for this project required strict anonymity, such that a cohort analysis 
of the data was not possible. 




builders not belonging to a building association whose names and contact details were sourced 
from local advertisements. 
 
B Profile of Respondents 
A total of 112 builders participated in the first survey which represents an overall response rate 
of 58.9%; while a total of 94 builders participated in the second survey, representing an overall 
response rate of 53.1%.4  Of those builders that responded to the first survey, 92.8% belonged 
to a professional association, while for Survey 2, 95.7% belonged to a professional association. 
Of all those builders belonging to a professional association in the target population, 74.3% 
agreed to participate in Survey 1 and 68.2% in Survey 2. Of all the builders who did not belong 
to a professional association, only 16% agreed to participate in Survey 1 and 8.9% in Survey 
2.  The non-members, all of whom were sourced for newspaper and online advertisements in 
the Sydney local area newspapers, were generally more reluctant to participate in the survey. 
On the other hand, those respondents belonging to a professional association were more willing 
to engage in discussions during the telephone interview. This finding is consistent in both 
survey periods.  In Table 3 we report the survey response rates for member and non-members 
across the two surveys. 
Table 3 – Membership of Professional Association 






Sample size 140 50 190 132 45 177 
Respondents 104 8 112 90 4 94 
Response rate 74.3% 16% 58.9% 68.2% 8.9% 53.1% 
 
In Table 4 we disaggregate the results in Table 3 according to the mix of activities in the 
residential construction industry. Of all the respondents in Survey 1, 17% were engaged, for 
the majority of the time in the construction of new dwellings while the remaining 83% were 
engaged in renovations & repairs. A total of 48 (or 42.9%) of respondents reported to be 
involved in both the construction of new dwellings and the renovations & repairs sector, of 
which 44 (or 91.7%) of these respondents were members of at least one professional building 
association.  Of all the respondents in Survey 2, 37.2% was also engaged, for the majority of 
the time in the construction of new dwellings while the remaining 62.8% was engaged in 
renovations & repairs. A total of 57 (or 60.6%) of respondents reported to be involved in both 
the construction of new dwellings and the renovations & repairs sector, of which all but one 
these respondents were members of at least one professional building association.   
 
                                                          
4 In the first survey, a total of seven respondents did not provide an answer to the question on the size of the 
cash economy. When this information is required in the analysis, the sample size is reduced from 112 to 105. 




Table 4 – Survey Results: Type of Residential Construction and Building Membership 












19 17% 16, (84.2%) 35 37.2% 34, (97.1%) 
Alternations and 
Additions (Majority) 
93 83% 88, (94.6%) 59 62.8% 57, (96.6%) 
New Constructions 
and Alterations and 
Additions Combined 




IV EFFECTS OF REGULATORY CHANGE ON CASH ECONOMY ACTIVITY 
 
Each year the ATO announces a select number of industries along with various types of 
personal and professional tax deductions that it will subject to scrutiny in its annual audit 
activities. The cash economy is without doubt the activity that receives most attention however 
specific sectors of the cash economy are often the focus of these targeted audits.  The building 
and construction industry often faces the line-up as one of the risky industries, along with cafes, 
restaurants and the trades. 
During the intervening period between the first and second builder’s survey, the ATO 
implemented its Taxable Payment Reporting System in the building and construction industry. 
This reporting requirement has, as we have indicated earlier, generated a large compliance 
dividend for the government. What is not clear despite these windfall gains is the extent by 
which the cash economy in the building industry has reduced in size. The use of surveys to 
gauge whether these activities are still likely to be taking place provides an alternative means 
to determine the likely impact on these surreptitious activities following the introduction of a 
regulatory change targeting the cash economy.  
Has the introduction of the TPRS in the building and construction industry reduced the size of 
the cash economy? In this section we will consider whether this regulatory change in reporting 
has had an effect on the cash economy by examining whether builders’ perceptions across a 
range of issues including their views on the size of the cash economy, the trends in cash 
economy activities, and the effects the cash economy has on legitimate prices and incomes, 
have changed since the introduction of the TPRS. It is to these specific issues that we now turn 
to evaluate the impact of TPRS. 
 
A Size of the cash economy 
Has the introduction of the TPRS reduced the size of the cash economy? The majority of the 
builders surveyed before and after the introduction of the TPRS consistently reported that a 




significant part of the cash economy takes place at the lower value segment of the market, 
where traditionally a higher percentage of payments are made in cash. These typically involve 
renovation more so than in the construction of new dwellings, although evidence exists for 
both.  New dwelling construction is unlikely to attract the same volume of cash payments given 
that transactions in this market would typically involve larger volumes of cash that is difficult 
to conceal or spend without detection. Needless to say, the existence of the cash economy 
across the whole of the building and construction industry was confirmed in both surveys.  
 
Prior to the introduction of the TPRS, the builders surveyed indicated that on average 
approximately 14.5% of transactions in the home building industry are likely to go unreported 
while builders post- TPRS indicated that the average unreported income was likely to be higher 
at 15.5% of transactions, although the increase was found to be statistically insignificantly (Δ= 
1.0, p=0.531). This finding suggests that despite the introduction of the TPRS, there does not 
appear to have been a significant reduction in the overall size of cash economy activity in the 
building and construction industry. This overall increase in the size of the cash economy is 
being driven by strong level of activities across two regions (East and West Sydney) while the 
other regions of the Sydney housing market experienced some falls. 
 
Table 5 – Percentage of Total Business Activity in the Cash Economy by Region  
  Pre-TPRS Post-TPRS 
  (% of business activity) (% of business activity) 
Inner Sydney 17.57% 14.83% 
East 10.47% 15.15% 
South 13.02% 11.00% 
West 13.29% 15.63% 
North 13.74% 12.33% 
 
 
B Trends in cash economy activity 
 
Has the introduction of the TPRS affected the level of participation in the cash economy over 
time? The results in Table 6 (a, b, c) provide builders’ perceptions on how the cash economy 
has changed in the two years leading up to each of the two surveys. For the second wave of the 
survey, two years prior marks the introduction of the TPRS. Builders interviewed in both 
surveys reported a mix of opinion on how the cash economy had changed in size.  In Table 6a 
we report the overall perceptions on the size of the cash economy - whether it has increased, 
decreased, stayed the same or not sure. Tables 6b and 6c report similar results but for those 
respondents that indicated in their view that the cash economy was less-than or equal-to 10% 








Table 6a – Perceptions of how the Cash Economy has changed over the previous two years: Overall 
respondents (%) 
 Pre-TPRS Post-TPRS 
Increased 26.67 20.21 
Decreased 11.43 27.66 
Stayed the same 37.14 32.98 
Don’t know 24.76 19.15 
 
Table 6b – Perceptions of how the Cash Economy has changed over the previous two years: 
Respondents (%) reporting a cash economy ≤10% 
 Pre-TPRS Post-TPRS 
Increased 18.03 9.76 
Decreased 14.75 36.59 
Stayed the same 37.70 34.15 
Don’t know 29.51 19.51 
 
Table 6c – Perceptions of how the Cash Economy has changed over the previous two years: 
Respondents (%) reporting a cash economy >10%  
 Pre-TPRS Post-TPRS 
Increased 38.64 23.30 
Decreased 6.82 20.75 
Stayed the same 36.36 32.08 
Don’t know 18.18 18.87 
 
Prior to the introduction of the TPRS, approximately 26.7% of builder indicated that the cash 
economy had increased in the two years prior to the survey, while only 20.2% of builders post-
TPRS reported an increase in the prior two years (see Table 6a). In contrast, only 11.4% of 
builders reported a decline in the cash economy in the two years prior to the first survey (pre-
TPRS) while 27.7% of builders reported a decline in these activities in the two years after the 
introduction of TPRS (see Table 6a). When we consider the responses of builders who 
indicated that the cash economy was less than 10% of total transactions in the period prior to 
the introduction of the TPRS, 18% of these builders believed the cash economy increased in 
size in the lead up to the first survey while only 9.8% of respondents indicated the cash 
economy increased since the introduction of TPRS (see Table 6b). When we consider the 
responses of builders who indicated that the cash economy was greater than 10% of total 
transactions in the period prior to the introduction of the TPRS, 38.6% of these builders 
believed the cash economy increased in size in the lead up to the first survey while only 23.3% 
of respondents indicated the cash economy increased since the introduction of TPRS (see Table 
6c). A total of 6.8% of builders pre-TPRS reported declines in the cash economy while a total 
of 20.8% of builders reported a decrease in cash economy activity in the two years since the 
introduction of the TPRS.  
 
Across both surveys, approximately one-third of builders believed that cash economy had not 
changed in size in the two years prior to the first survey and in the two years since the 
introduction of the TPRS. On the other hand, approximately 18-29% of builders were not sure 




(see Tables 6a-6c). The results in Table 6a suggest that approximately 64% of builders in the 
period prior to the introduction of TPRS thought the cash economy increased or stayed the 
same in the two years prior to the survey, while only 53% of builders thought it had increased 
or stayed the same post-TPRS. The findings appear to suggest that the size of the cash economy 
may have declined after the introduction of TPRS, albeit from a higher level than that reported 
in the first survey to be approximately 15.5% of total transactions as reported earlier. Therefore 
despite some evidence of a decline in the overall size of the cash economy since the 
introduction of the TPRS (which explains the large compliance dividend post implementation), 
the size of the cash economy is still significantly large and more needs to be done to stem the 
tide of these illicit activities. 
 
 
C Cash economy effects on legitimate prices and income 
Has the introduction of the TPRS helped alleviate the unfair competitive pressures on 
legitimate business operators that frequently pressure them to lower their price quotations and 
consequently experience reductions in their business income?  Each of the two surveys asked 
builders to report on the impact that the cash economy had on their earnings (Table 7) and price 
quotes (Table 8) over the previous year. During the pre-TPRS period, builders were roughly 
split in their reporting of whether their income was affected by the cash economy (47.6% said 
‘Yes’, it affected them while 52.4% said ‘No’, it did not affect them). However, in the post-
TPRS period, a greater proportion of builders (approximately 61%) reported no negative effect 
on their income from the cash economy while the remaining 39% stated that it did impact them 
adversely. This may be explained by the reported decrease in cash economy post-TPRS, 
particularly in those areas of Sydney where the cash economy appeared to have declined (see 
Table 5). Those who reported reductions in income as a result of the cash economy during the 
pre-TPRS period indicated that it had fallen by 6.5% while respondents in the post-TPRS 
period reported that their income fell by 6.8%. This difference in the effect on income between 
the two survey periods was found to be statistically insignificant (Δ= 0.3, p=0.850), suggesting 
that the change in the size of cash economy activities has been marginal at best since the 
introduction of the TPRS.   
Table 7 – Impact on Income from Cash Economy Operators in the Building Industry  
  Pre-TPRS Post-TPRS 
  overall CE ≤10% CE >10% overall CE ≤10% CE >10% 
Yes 47.62% 42.62% 54.55% 39.36% 36.59% 41.51% 
No 52.38% 57.38% 45.45% 60.64% 63.41% 58.49% 
Reduction in 
income a 
6.53% 3.51% 10.80% 6.83% 6.27% 7.26% 
Notes: Question: Did your income fall as a result of competition from cash operators in the building industry (%) 
(a) Reduction in total income as a result of competition from cash operators (%) 
 
 




We find an interesting result when we consider these responses according to builder’s estimates 
of income that goes unreported.  We have chosen 10% unreported income as the threshold cut-
off point on the basis that this is the current goods and services (GST) tax rate, which 
anecdotally is also the price discount offered to those customers who pay cash for their goods 
and services. Approximately 43% of builders (pre-TPRS) who indicated that the cash economy 
was no more than 10% of all transactions, reported declines in their income by 3.5% as a result 
of the cash economy. On the other hand, those builders who indicated that the cash economy 
is greater than 10% of all transactions, reported reductions in their income by 10.8% - a 
statistically significant difference between the two groups (Δ= 7.28, p=0.001). The result for 
the post-TPRS produced only slightly different results. Approximately 37% of builders (post-
TPRS) period who indicated that the cash economy was no more than 10% of all transactions, 
reported a fall in their income by 6.3% while those builders who believed it to be greater than 
10%, reported  falls in their income by approximately 7.3%. The reported difference in the fall 
in income between these two groups was insignificant (Δ= 0.99, p=0.677). 
The extent by which prices fell varied somewhat across the two surveys. These results are 
reported in Table 8. Both surveys found that builders predominantly reported that the cash 
economy did not significantly impact on their price quotes. One of the cited reasons for this is 
that pricing low in order to compete with a ‘cash price’ makes it difficult to be profitable and 
so price quotes generally remained unchanged. The consequence of this is that those builders 
found it difficult to secure a job when competing with cash economy operators. This would 
explain why income reductions reported in Table 7 are still consistent with the results reported 
in Table 8. In the pre-TPRS period, a total of 20% of builders reported a fall in their price 
quotes as a result of the cash economy while in the post-TPRS period, 34% of builders reported 
having had to reduce their price quotes to remain competitive - a result consistent with the 
reported increase in the average size of the cash economy noted earlier. Across the two survey 
periods (pre- and post-TPRS), those builders who reported reductions in their price quotes as a 
result of competition from the cash economy suggested that they had been reduced by an 
amount between 2.6% and 5.9%, a difference that is statistically significant between the two 
periods (Δ= 3.3, p=0.004).  
Table 8 – Impact on Prices from Cash Economy Operators in the Building Industry  
  Pre-TPRS Post-TPRS 
  overall CE ≤10% CE >10% overall CE ≤10% CE >10% 
Yes 20.00% 16.39% 25.00% 34.04% 24.39% 41.51% 
No 80.00% 83.61% 75% 65.96% 75.61% 58.49% 
Reduction 
in price a 
2.56% 1.86% 3.52% 5.93% 3.46% 7.83% 
Notes: Question - Did your price quotes fall as a result of competition from cash operators in the  
building industry (%); (a) Reduction in total income as a result of competition from cash operators (%) 
 
 
We find an interesting result when we consider these responses according to builder’s estimates 
of income that goes unreported. In the pre-TPRS period, those builders who indicated that the 




cash economy was no greater than 10% of all transactions, reported a reduction in their pricing 
by 1.9% on average while those who believed the cash economy exceed 10% of all transactions, 
reported a reduction in their prices by 3.5% (Δ= 1.6, p=0.171). During the post-TPRS period, 
approximately 24% of builders who indicated that the cash economy was no more than 10% of 
all transactions reported reductions in their pricing by 3.5% while 42% of builders who 
believed the cash economy to be greater than 10%, reported falls in their price quotations by 
approximately 7.8% - a difference that is statistically significant (Δ= 4.3, p=0.036).  
 
The combination of a need to continue with reductions in price quotations and a consequential 
fall in business income even after the introduction of the TPRS, suggests that cash economy 
activity in the housing market is still substantial enough to produce effective price-competitive 
pressures on legitimate business operators. On the basis of these findings, the introduction of 
the TPRS has at best had only a marginal impact on reducing the overall size of the cash 
economy in the two years leading up to the survey. 
  
D Perceptions on the effects of a cash economy 
Have more builders become aware of the adverse consequences of the cash economy on 
legitimate business following the introduction of the TPRS? The ATO goes to considerable 
length to educate the public not only on good record keeping and changes in compliance 
requirements but also on the risks and implications of engaging in the cash economy either as 
a buyer or a seller. The effect of the former shows up in compliance data or from audit 
initiatives but the latter is more difficult to quantify because it is not directly observable. A 
consumer is attracted to a cheaper price when given the option between two alternatives – one 
price that includes the tax (i.e., the goods and services tax) and the other which does not. This 
is not to say that the cash economy price is always a direct function of the tax but it is easier to 
discount a tax component when the tax is highly visible in the quoted price. Prior to the 
introduction of the GST in Australia, it is highly likely that cash economy pricing was subject 
to arbitrary discounting set by the builder since then the norm appears to be a discount 
equivalent to the GST. When builders were asked who in the deliberations initiates the 
discussion of cash payments, the builders reported that the consumer did so approximately 70% 
of the time. This finding (see Table 9) marginally increased (but not significantly) after the 
introduction of the TPRS (Δ= 1.29, p=0.612). 
 
Table 9 – Offers and Requests for Cash (instances of consumers and builders requesting cash in return 









Pre-TPRS 32.01% 67.99% 
Post-TPRS 30.00% 70.00% 




How then does this predominantly consumer-driven request for cash, combined with these 
regulatory changes, affect the perceptions of cash economy activity? In Figure 2, we report 
how builders’ views on the consequences of the cash economy have changed since the 
introduction of TPRS, specifically on competition, prices, wages, recruitment of workers and 
the image the cash economy portrays of those working in the building and construction 
industry.  
 
Figure 2 – Respondent’s views on the impact of the cash economy in the residential construction 




The results in Figure 2 suggest that the perceptions of the adverse effects of the cash economy 
have remained consistent pre- and post-TPRS. Following the introduction of the TPRS, a 
greater proportion of builders identified that the cash economy has a range of adverse 
consequences on the legitimate economy, citing in particular that it creates unfair price 
competition, forces legitimate businesses to lower prices, lowers wages in the building 
industry, makes it less attractive to recruit workers because of the bad image these activities 
portray. This increase in the proportion of builders identifying the adverse consequences may 
be the result of the education campaign that accompanied the introduction of the TPRS. It is 
difficult to know from these survey results whether this was the case. 
 
E Contractors 
Builders reporting on the percentage of time contractors and sub-contractors supply services 
for cash declined from an average of 17.6% to 13.8% between 2009 and 2014 (a statistically 
significant difference; Δ= 3.8, p=0.02). In contrast, the perceptions of contractors and sub-
contractors under-invoicing (Δ= 1.08, p=0.65) and supplying materials for cash (Δ= 1.29, 
p=0.34) showed only marginal declines that were not statistically significant. Builder’s 
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by builders also fell marginally (statistically insignificant) between the pre- and post-TPRS 
periods. On this point, builders on average reported that close to one-third of those in the home 
building industry were most likely not to be paying the correct worker’s compensation 
insurance and this view did not change post-TPRS  (Δ= 1.43, p=0.62). Most of the concerns 
expressed by builders on workers compensation insurance were motivated by the complexity 
and the ‘confusing nature’ of the legislation. A comparison of the responses across the two 
surveys on each of these points is presented in Figure 3.  
Figure 3- Respondent’s views on illicit activities in the residential construction sector (% agreeing to 
each of the 4 statements) 
 
The results in Figure 3 suggest a marginal change in cash economy activity following the 
introduction of the TPRS, despite the fall in contractors working for cash since the introduction 
of the TPRS. There may be various reasons for this: (i) there are those who work completely 
surreptitiously with no intentions of working legitimately; (ii) those unemployed who choose 
to participate in the cash economy to supplement their unemployment benefits; and (iii) those 
contractors who negotiate with builders to supply trade services for heavily discounted prices 
in return for being kept off the books and their identities not disclosed. These complicit 
arrangements make it difficult to undercover such activities despite the introduction of this 
reporting system that requests records of each specific supplier transactions. 
 
 
F Unqualified builders 
The percentage of builders who were aware of people working in the construction industry that 
also received unemployment benefits decreased only marginally from 75.2% to 71.3% after 
the introduction of the TPRS. On the other hand, the percentage of builders reporting on those 
who are unqualified but take on work in the sector as a second job increased to 87.2% post-
TPRS (up from 83.8% pre- TPRS) and for those workers pretending to pass themselves off as 
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responses between the pre- and post-TPRS is illustrated in Figure 4. The introduction of the 
TPRS appears to have again only marginally affected builder’s perceptions of cash economy 
activity in the building and construction industry.  These findings mirror the results presented 
in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 4 – Unemployed and unqualified cash economy participants   
 
 
G Tackling the Cash Economy 
In both surveys, builders were asked to comment on the various government agencies and their 
strategies to tackle cash economy activity.  Each builder was read a number of statements and 
asked to respond on whether they thought the strategy would be effective or not and then to 
provide some general comments on their responses. Figure 5 presents the overall results for all 
builders combined and those grouped by their perception of how large is the cash economy – 
those who believe it is less than or equal to 10% and those who believe it is greater than 10%. 
The combined results for all builders (not shown here) suggest an increase in the number of 
respondents agreeing to the effectiveness of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) (responsible for 
safeguarding the rights of all consumers), the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), Centrelink 
(responsible for social security payments) and the WorkCover Authority of NSW (responsible 
for ensuring the health, safety and welfare of workers) in dealing with the cash economy. For 
example, approximately 57% of builders in the pre-TPRS period believed that expanding the 
surveillance and enforcement efforts by the ATO could reduce the cash economy, while this 
number increased to 68% of builders post-TPRS.  
 
On the effectiveness of the Office of Fair Trading, 31% of builders in the period pre-TPRS 
indicated that increasing the surveillance and enforcement efforts would help tackle the cash 
economy, while this increased to 40% of builders post-TPRS. A similar result was found for 
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introduction of TPRS, which increased to 35% post-TPRS. The results were somewhat 
different for Centrelink. Approximately 45% of builders reported that expanding the 
surveillance and enforcement efforts of Centrelink would reduce the cash economy but this 
number declined only to 41.5% post-TPRS. The results in Figure 5 for the two cohorts of 
builders in each of the two surveys portray a similar finding.  
 
Figure 5 – Respondent’s view on strategies to reduce the cash economy in the residential 
construction sector (% agreeing to each of the 7 statements that the strategy is effective)  
 
 
The respondents also indicated that education is an effective tool in combatting the cash 
economy. Prior to TPRS, approximately 73.3% of builders indicated that educating consumers 
about the risks of having work completed by cash economy operators would be effective. In 
the period after the introduction of TPRS, this number increased to 74.5%. The results were 
somewhat different when asked if educating people about the risks of working in the cash 
economy would be effective. Prior to the TPRS, approximately 55% of builders agreed that 
this would be effective and while 61.7% of builders agreed to the statement post-TPRS. 
Although the percentage of respondents increased, the overall level of agreement is much lower 
for educating prospective cash economy workers than it is for educating consumers. A more 
punitive measure was deemed by builders to be more effective for dealing with workers in the 
cash economy. The results in Figure 5 suggest that these findings are also consistent when 
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A growing body of literature on the cash economy has focused on the aggregate country-level 
estimates but little is known of the industry level measures that comprise the aggregate size of 
the cash economy. Using the results from a comprehensive telephone survey of home builders 
in 2007-8 and 2014-15, we provide the first known analysis of the behaviour, characteristics 
and perceptions of cash economy activity in the residential building and construction sector in 
Australia – a sector which has been under significant scrutiny by the ATO in recent years. In 
2012-13, the ATO introduced the Taxable Payment Reporting System which yielded the 
government a significant compliance dividend. By comparing the survey responses of builders 
before and after the introduction of this reporting system, we are able to gauge the impact this 
has had on grassroots activity in the cash economy. Despite the compliance dividend and the 
additional number of businesses that have been found to under-report or not report at all, the 
survey findings indicate that the cash economy in the building industry is still thriving. The 
introduction of the Taxable Payments Reporting System appears to have had some impact on 
the cash economy, most notably on the reported cash activities of contractors. This is a positive 
result given that the new reporting system was designed specifically to identify contractors 
participating in the cash economy. By requesting builders to report on each individual 
contractor they have engaged in a given financial year, the taxation office is able to data match 
the reported income by those same contractors. Any discrepancies would alert the taxation 
office to investigate further. The results also suggested that a considerable number of cash 
economy operators are also likely to be in receipt of unemployment benefits or passing 
themselves off to be qualified builders when in fact they are not.   
 
Since the introduction of these new reporting requirements, builder’s perception on the 
effectiveness of increased surveillance powers by the appropriate government authorities 
(ATO, Centrelink, Office of Fair Trading and WorkCover Authority) over the two survey 
periods have improved. The same is true for builder’s perceptions on the effectiveness of 
education campaigns, although the effects on convincing cash economy operators of the legal 
risks of doing so were not seen as effective as an education campaign for consumers.  
 
The marginal differences in responses across the two surveys suggest that much more targeted 
strategies are necessary to curb cash economy activity. Initiatives such as the introduction of 
the Taxable Payments Reporting System are a step in the right direction but more focused 
approaches may be required to tackle specific areas of the cash economy activity where the 
tentacles of such policies do not reach. These are important actions if the adverse economic 
and social consequences of the cash economy are to be significantly dampened. Surveys such 
as these are important instruments to uncover the types of activities taking place in the cash 
economy however it is also necessary to accommodate different strategies across industries if 
these are to have any significant impact on the overall size of the cash economy. 
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